Insights of how corruption hampers law enforcement in governance of common-pool resources are currently limited. This article develops our understanding of this process through interviews with enforcement officials in South African fisheries. First, it outlines how inspectors become "blind and corrupt": They receive bribes from fishermen in the form of finance, food, or friendship, which they pay back through inadequate enforcement, information-sharing, or involvement. Second, it shows that widespread corruption increases the costs of remaining honest: Inspectors face a dilemma related to corruption in the judiciary, making the writing of fines useless because these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Moreover, they face a dilemma of corruption in their organization, where substation managers and actors in top management are engaged in bribery, sending signals that corruption has small consequences. The article concludes by discussing how corruption distorts regulations and the implications for governing the commons.
Introduction
How to achieve cooperation that entails welfare for the collective yet require restrictions on the behavior of individuals is a puzzle that continues to engage political theorists. Hobbes posited that covenants -promises to follow agreements of engaging in certain behaviorrequired an external agent to enforce such pledges with the threat of force (Hobbes 1960 (Hobbes [1651 ). Yet, research on governance of the commons has found numerous examples of when individuals manage to limit their use of resources without relying on enforcement by an outside agent (e.g. Ostrom 1990 ). An illustration of self-organized institutions for rule enforcement in common-pool resources (CPRs) -resources that are under rivalry and where exclusion is difficult, such as irrigation schemes or fisheries -are for instance herders on pasture lands who monitor each others' behavior and successfully impose sanctions on those who break their pledges. The literature has therefore described the two situations of externally governed or self-governed enforcement of commitments as "covenants with or without swords" (Ostrom et al. 1992) .
1 Recently however, political theorists have urged scholars to remember the often-important role of the state in governance of CPRs (Mansbridge 2014). There are numerous instances where government authorities function as enforcers "with swords" as to coordinate group efforts in CPRs. The public park guards employed to protect wildlife from illegal hunting on a savannah is one such example. Nevertheless, in a majority of the world's countries today, government authorities face the problem of bureaucracy infested with corruption. This article argues that when state agents enforce regulations in a corrupt context, a situation of "covenants with broken swords" could arise. In this condition widespread bribery distorts law enforcement and few sanctions are imposed on CPR users' noncompliance to regulations. So far, scholars studying governance of the commons have not addressed the implications of this reality in detail.
The question of who guards the guards is a pertinent issue in political thought and refers to risks of corruption in enforcement authorities, a problem discussed in Plato's The Republic (Besley & Robinson 2010) . The literature provides anecdotal evidence as well as formal models for why corruption tends to bring suboptimal law enforcement (Becker & 1 Referring to that "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength" (Hobbes 1960 (Hobbes [1651 ).
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Stigler 1974; Polinsky & Shavell 2000) . Yet, the precise way that corruption risks hampering the effectiveness of regulations has not been thoroughly explored. While some studies have focused on how corruption affects citizens' compliance to regulations (e.g. Levi et al. 2009 ), few studies have analyzed how the choice of government agents to enforce regulations, or not, is affected by corruption. In fact, while corrupt officers are anecdotally mentioned as the cause for implementation failures -be it rangers responsible for rhino protection or traffic officers in urban areas -these "sleeping policemen" (Keane et al. 2008) has seldom been at the center of analysis. Previous research shows that enforcement agents active in a local community meet social disapproval when ensuring that appropriators comply with state regulations (Akpalu et al. 2009 ). Zealous enforcement could mean that they limit the income of their neighbors who, for instance, may gain their livelihood from the CPR regime in question. De la Torre-Castro (2006) has called this the "loyalty dilemma," where such agents find it difficult to enforce regulations in the community in which they live. However, it is unclear how the presence of widespread bribery affects the already difficult choice to enforce regulations in local communities and in what way corruption may be a further "enforcement dilemma" -that is, an obstacle for public officers to enforce the law.
When corruption is present in CPR regimes with government-imposed regulations, bribery may distort management. However, current literature lacks knowledge on how the presence of corruption affects public officials' choice to enforce or not enforce regulations. The aim is here to contribute theoretically and empirically by exploring the mechanisms in which this process takes place. In order to do so the article poses two ques- Damania et al. 2004 (for an overview of such studies, see Halkos et al. 2013) ). Such focus risks simplifying this relationship since single indicators hardly capture variation in levels of corruption and environmental health within countries and across sectors (Barrett et al. 2006) . This study follows the research vein of existing but scarce interest on the role of bribery in governance of natural resources on the local level (Wade 1982; Robbins 2000; Pellegrini 2011; Gore et al. 2013; Sundström 2013) .
Theory
Effective governance of CPRs is dependent on appropriators making commitments regarding their usage and adhering to these limitations. As Ostrom and colleagues (1999) have stated, "participants or external authorities must deliberately devise (and then monitor and enforce) rules that limit who can use a CPR, specify how much and when that use will be allowed, create and finance formal monitoring arrangements, and establish sanctions for nonconformance" (p. 279). In line with this conviction it has been stated that "effective governance requires that the rules of resource use are generally followed" (Dietz et al. 2003 (Dietz et al. , p. 1909 . It has also been said that the design of such regulations "must include efficient enforcement strategies to counteract harvesters' incentives to violate a regulation" (Velez et al. 2012, p. 185) . This implies that effective enforcement of regulations -although perhaps not a sufficient one -is a necessary condition for the sustainable governance of CPRs.
2 Mansbridge (2014) discusses how the literature on the commons has to some extent forgotten the often-important role of the state in managing the commons. The most important role of the state, she writes, is "to help in the necessary activities of monitoring 6 compliance and sanctioning defection from compliance in the implementing phase" (p. 9).
As such, the state is often present in CPR governance as an external authority to enforce regulations as to coordinate group efforts (Mansbridge 2010) . When government personnel make up these authorities, its agents are responsible for enforcing existing regulations and ensuring that subjects abide by these laws. In a context of CPRs, noncompliance is, for instance, when appropriators -be it hunters or fishermen -exceed harvesting limits, harvest with prohibited means, or with no entitled right at all.
3
The relationship between appropriators of CPRs affected by formal regulations and government officers responsible for enforcing these rules have been described as an idealized two-agent game. Gibson (1999) models the relation between poachers and government inspectors. 4 In this game the government inspector faces two choices: to enforce or not to enforce wildlife regulations. Depending on the choice of the poacher -and the resulting outcome of the game -this renders different payoffs to the inspector. Sjöstedt (2014) develops this reasoning and models a relationship between two agents, the government and the resource users. Accordingly, both actors would benefit the most from an enforce-comply situation: "The resource users would under such circumstances benefit from the fact that the government makes sure that other fishermen follow the fishery regulation, and the common pool resources would be sustainably managed for everyone's longterm benefit. The government would in turn benefit from citizens' compliance by not being forced to employ too much resources into chasing non-compliers" (p. 11). A suboptimal equilibrium of this game, "where the government does not enforce institutional arrangements and where resource users do not comply" (p. 13), will increase the likelihood of overharvesting of CPRs.
In this paper I use a similar model to illustrate the focus of this study. In the model visualized below (Figure 1 ) the state actor is not "government" as in Sjöstedt (2014), but rather the individual inspector (c.f. Gibson 1999) . The two important points of depar-7 ture is that I focus on the role of the government inspectors in this stylized model and that their choice has been described as one between "enforce" or "not enforce" when interacting with resource appropriators. Moreover, as the next section will highlight, an important aspect is that the literature has not theorized sufficiently on how this choice is affected by the presence of corruption.
FIGURE 1. THE INSPECTORS' CHOICE TO ENFORCE FORMAL REGULATIONS

Corruption in governing the commons
As Mansbridge (2010 Mansbridge ( , 2014 has argued, the literature on the commons has in its focus on studying the examples of successful self-governance not been very attentive to the oftenimportant role of the state as the enforcer of existing regulations. However, I will argue that yet another blind spot of this literature is the lack of attention towards the fact that many of these government authorities are permeated by bribery. Corruption -most often defined as "the abuse of public power for private gain" (Treisman 2000, p. 399 ) -has started to become emphasized by some scholars from this tradition. When Ostrom (2005) summarized two decades of research on CPRs she formulated five threats to small-scale resources governance that she had come in contact with, one of them being "corruption and rent-seeking" (p. 275). Yet, these issues have seldom been investigated empirically or sufficiently theorized in previous research. For instance, Agrawal (2007) The scarce but existing scholarly attention on the mechanisms causing corruption to hamper enforcement of regulations has focused foremost on the actors presented in the lower part of Figure 1 , or more specifically, how compliance decisions are affected by corruption (e.g. Levi et al. 2009; Sundström 2012 Becker and Stigler (1974) noted that the quality of law enforcement -that is, the extent to which bribery distorts enforcement -depends on the temporal interaction between law officials and violators: "transaction costs of ascertaining that the other party is reliable become manageable for both violators and enforcers" (p. 4). This implies that the nature of the situation in which law officers work and live close to their regulatory subjects (thus they face each other more frequently and for a longer time) should be qualitatively different from more anonymous and unreliable interactions. In the local governance of natural resources this type of interaction often characterizes the relationship between regulatory agents and subjects. The local enforcement officer may very well be a part of the local community that earns its livelihood on the resource that this agent monitors. 5 On this topic previous research shows that enforcing agents active in a local community meet social disapproval when enforcing environmental regulations (Akpalu et al. 2009 ). De la Torre-9
Castro (2006) has called this the "loyalty dilemma", where inspectors find it difficult to enforce regulations in the community in which they live. For instance the article mentions how local Tanzanian village-based enforcing agents would abstain from reporting illegal species caught by fishermen in the village. An enforcement dilemma is here understood as factors hindering public officers to enforce the law. So far it has not been analyzed whether corruption can function as an obstacle for inspectors active in a local community.
To date, the existing studies provide little knowledge -besides the general statement of "inefficient" or "hampered" law enforcement -of how corruption in detail distorts the choice of enforcing regulations among government inspectors in such local governance. The general purpose here is to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms in which this process takes place by investigating the two questions posed in the introduction.
The study
The enforcement of fisheries regulations in South Africa is particularly well suited for investigating these queries. First, fisheries are a typical example of a CPR where we find the challenges of monitoring the harvest behavior of resource appropriators. Second, in this resource regime the state acts as the enforcer of formal regulations. Third, the institutional setting is that of a high-corruption context. These features make this case ideal if one aims to explore how corruption hampers enforcement of state-imposed regulations in a CPR.
Governance structure and regulation of the South African marine fisheries
The marine fisheries of South Africa offer large export earnings and are in some areas a major source of local employment. Historically, the fisheries were mismanaged during the 
FIGURE 2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMPLIANCE DIRECTORATE IN THE CONTEXT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Regulatory compliance and corruption in this sector
There is plenty of evidence suggesting that noncompliance to the above described regulations is widespread across different fisheries and regions along the coast. In general the control of protected areas is low and there is widespread illegal fishing in the line-fishing sector. Poaching is specifically prevalent in fisheries targeting the south coast rock lobster (Jasus lalandii) and abalone (Haliotis midae, an edible mollusk) (see Pramod et al. 2011) . As an illustration, Raemaekers and Britz (2009) Anecdotes suggest that law enforcement in this sector has been tainted with corruption (e.g. Hauck & Sweijd 1999; Raemaekers et al. 2011; Hauck & Fernandez-Gallardo 2013 
Methodology
In total 43 interviews were conducted during the period from January to April 2014. Out of these, 34 persons were inspectors at the Compliance Directorate of the DAFF. Four persons were former senior managers from this directorate, including past directors. The other five persons were key stakeholders: two journalists specializing in covering developments in fisheries, a university professor focusing on the politics of fisheries, and two leaders of fishermen associations, all purposely sampled due to their insight in the situation.
The interviews with inspectors were sanctioned from the top managers of the department. Management sent a general message to the entire affected compliance staff that I would be permitted to interview some of them on the topic of challenges in the enforcement apparatus. However, I did not share with the management who participated. The interviews were conducted at substations along the western and southern coast (the number and location of substations will remain confidential) as well as in the head office. The context of each substation varies: in some areas poaching is widespread, in others noncompliance is more controlled. Also the extent of corrupt practices is known to vary from substation to substation. This perception was corroborated through informal talks with fishermen in these areas.
The respondents were selected in order to vary the features of substations as well as individual characteristics of inspectors. To ensure the anonymity of respondents taken 13 from this relatively limited pool of inspectors, the article will not describe any of the respondents in detail since a combination of features could identify certain individuals. 7 The years of working experience is most likely influential to familiarities regarding bribery.
Among respondents, the working experience as an inspector ranged from less than one year to over 40 years. Care was also taken to sample inspectors that have long-term experi-
ence, yet are no longer employed, because this supposedly would make them more open to talking freely. Two respondents retired within the year prior to the interview session, thus, not too long before as to make their views lose relevance.
The interviews were made without a recording device since this was the prerequisite for ensuring confidentiality. I therefore took extensive and detailed notes during the interviews. The conversation was structured along themes related to the challenges of enforcing the MLRA regulations. Throughout these sessions English was used (the second language for approximately half of the respondents) and no other person was present.
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Corruption was discussed on all occasions and, in general, the perception is that respondents were open about their behavior. In fact, several respondents admitted to having taken bribes and granting noncompliance and discussed such situations in length. On some occasions the respondents were more comfortable talking about how colleagues behave in this regard. Also, some respondents became more open during the session. They would, for instance, first deny being aware of any corruption, yet would after a few minutes describe how colleagues regularly took bribes. Moreover, some interviews could be used as triangulations of more factual circumstances. For instance, one respondent claimed to never have taken bribes. However, several respondents singled out this person as notoriously corrupt.
When encountered with this claim at a second interview session, this respondent admitted to some of these allegations. Similarly, some respondents admitted to minor misbehavior, such as underreporting catches, while denying alleged involvement in poaching activities.
Due to social desirability, several respondents have likely been lying about their own in-7 Care was taken to speak with both women and men (five women were included although they are quite scarce in the general pool of inspectors) and both substation managers and subordinate inspectors. Moreover, both black, colored [a specific category in South African context] and white inspectors, as well as inspectors with college education were sampled. 8 On two occasions respondents asked to be interviewed in a pair, together with a colleague. The interviews with respondents 33 and 34 as well as respondents 2 and 3 were conducted in this manner.
14 volvement in corrupt practices. However, this is not a major potential problem for the reliability of the information because respondents still gave a detailed account of how bribes are used in their daily work and how this is perceived to influence their possibilities of enforcing regulations.
Results
The empirical discussion is structured into two sections. The first one reports the insights related to the first research question, focusing on disentangling the way corruption corrodes the enforcement of regulations. The second one investigates the way corruption poses an enforcement obstacle for inspectors.
The corrosion of enforcement
The respondents certainly perceive widespread corruption in the sector. While it is not viable in this type of sampling to estimate how common the practice of bribery is, it should be noted that respondents give a uniform image of the almost endemic state of bribery.
The following quote is illustrative:
We 
The inspectors often get tickets to rugby games from boat owners … I myself used to go to a rugby match or two … I used to get a box of fish from the fishing companies. But there is a line to cross. I don't think I crossed it. Because I didn't take these boxes in public, in front of people on the pier. It would not have looked good. We did it in the office instead. But I never encouraged it. I never asked for it. Because it can get out of hand. How can you prosecute them? So you shouldn't actually do it ... [five minutes later in the interview] But taking a box of fish is so wrong. You shouldn't do it. It shouldn't be a praxis. I was never perfect. (I:18)
The exchange between an inspector and a fisherman can also be further blurred, as many of them know each other. Being blind can therefore be understood as a consequence of a friendship or a way of maintaining relations with these fishermen. Having small substations -where inspectors live close to the community -and inspectors that have been in the same place for a long time are perceived as especially spurring this problem: The obstacle of having corruption in the organization is also related to actions in higher management. This corruption is a bit different than the interplay between inspectors and fishermen. Staff members that are not inspectors also find ways of enriching themselves:
I have seen this corruption so much … Say an inspector used to go to school with a poacher, then they owe each other in some sense … How can I enforce the law on an old friend? … [They] know your soft spots. It has happened to me, I have also been blind. (I:25)
In top management they are very corrupt … They get a lot of gifts, money, boxes of wines. This is from industrial actors to get quotas so they can continue fishing. And if some case gets public it gets withdrawn. And the people in the top are of course quite happy with this system. (I:29)
A 
Discussion
This investigation provides theoretical nuances related to the first research question, in what way that corruption corrodes enforcement. As fleshed out in these accounts, there are analytical categories that can improve our understanding of this process. Bribery involving resource users in this context seem to come in three distinct forms, through finance, food, or friendship. While these forms of bribes differ between each other -the first being monetary, the second being non-monetary and the third being an even more vaguely defined transaction -the three categories share that they all target inspectors to be blind to violations.
Moreover, the accounts suggest that the mechanisms in this process can be further nuanced analytically. Enforcement agents seem to become blind in three different ways, which are analytically separated from each other. Inspectors may engage in inadequate enforcement, practices that could include no monitoring at all, the intended misreporting of landings, or the systematic writing of faulty fines. They may also start to engage in infor-mation sharing, revealing details of secret operations. Finally, blindness to violations among such agents may take the shape of involvement, where enforcement officials become a part in illegal actions through transportation of goods, stealing catches, lending freezers for storage or even start poaching themselves. Having found these mechanisms in the empirical accounts it is also interesting to explore how they can be used to improve our theoretical understanding of this process.
First, it can be noted that blindness could be understood through the work of Kahn and colleagues (2001) . They make the conceptual distinctions between temptations affecting a public official into two categories: shirking (the avoidance of duties) and corruption (the extraction of a bribe from an evader) (p. 189). The process of becoming blind and corrupt can therefore be seen as the process linking these phenomena. When an enforcement officer has received a bribe, this agent will 'shirk' selectively to benefit certain resource users.
Second, this more nuanced understanding of blindness to violations is important as it points to the fact that "not enforce" -one of the two choices by the state actor used in the game-like situations outlined by Gibson (1999) and Sjöstedt (2014) -is a simplified understanding of defection in such interactions. It seems that blindness, rather than only a choice of not enforcing, consists of different strategies. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . I have here found three distinctive categories: inadequate enforcement, information sharing, and involvement. They are all different strategies than the choice to enforce regulations.
Moreover, they differ to each other in their impact on other inspectors' decisions, as there is possibly a rank order in how these different options affect management. Inadequate enforcement is the moderate obstacle for enforcement, affecting mostly the individual relationship between the inspector and a resource user. Information sharing on the other hand is understood as a larger impediment, potentially ruining other inspectors' possibilities of enforcing regulations. Finally, the involvement of inspectors in poaching is perhaps the worst type of hurdle as it fundamentally turns the inspector into a complicit agent in the activities they should prevent.
FIGURE 3. THE INSPECTORS' CHOICE TO ENFORCE FORMAL REGULATIONS UNDER WIDE-SPREAD CORRUPTION
Moreover, the interviews inform us theoretically about the second question, how corruption becomes an obstacle in the inspectors' enforcement work. First, inspectors face a context dilemma, making the writing of fines useless as these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Second, they face an organizational dilemma where substation managers and actors in top management of their own organization are known to be involved in corrupt behavior, thus further demotivating the inspectors. Signals from above indicate that it is accepted to enrich yourself and that there are few consequences if you get caught. Importantly, it renders whistle-blowing inefficient as inspectors risk telling someone involved in corruption. Also, becoming blind and corrupt gives advantages to individual inspectors as you are known among colleagues as one who can be included in shady transactions, sanctioned by substation managers. In tandem, the two dilemmas create disincentives to individual inspectors for honest behavior. Put differently, the choice of remaining honest and enforcing laws becomes much more costly for individuals when the presence of bribery has spread in the enforcement chain and in the responsible agency. In such settings it is more likely that enforcing agents will choose one of the defecting strategies discussed above.
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In relation to the findings of Akpalu et al. (2009) So what are the implications of these findings for our understanding of the governance of the commons? On a more general level, the argument in this article was presented at the backdrop of the debate where scholars have depicted the choice of enforcement in CPR governance as one between covenants "with or without swords." As a contrasting view this article has proposed that when bribery is prevalent in the agency imposing regulations on a CPR, this can be depicted as covenants "with broken swords." As Table 1 illustrates, the situation of widespread corruption in law enforcement can be contrasted to the situation with a government enforcer but with no corruption present. Importantly, the process outlined in this article, clearly show that in situations with corruption, the likelihood of achieving sustainable outcomes for management of CPRs is severely decreased. When regulations -the policy tools that are meant to steer behavior of resource appropriators -are not enforced due to widespread bribery, this will increase the probability of a "tragedy" where resources are overharvested.
Then how can the path in such situations be reversed? The results from the empirical investigation speaks to a general understanding among studies on corruption where government agents find it difficult to act honestly when bribery is endemic within and outside of the organization. The literature suggests that bureaucrats' incentives for corrupt behavior is affected by perceptions of other bureaucrats' behavior in the organization (Shleifer & Vishny 1993; Olken & Pande 2012) . This echoes previous findings where indi-26 vidual refusals to engage in bribery in a highly corrupt context are perceived as futile (Karklins 2005; Miller 2006) . It is also compatible with an understanding that corruption can be described as a social dilemma, where it is rational for actors to partake in corrupt behavior if "everybody else" is perceived as doing it (Rothstein 2005) . This is most likely an important point as it is imperative to keep such considerations in mind when discussing ways to reform corrupt authorities. For instance, as accounts indicated, corruption in the top of this department may influence the behavior of street-level employees. Reform programs targeting bribery among local enforcement officers on the ground may need to consider strategies where corruption in top management is also dealt with. 
Conclusions
This article focuses on a problem that has been somewhat overlooked when political theorists and empirically oriented scholars have analyzed the challenge of monitoring in governance of CPRs. While research holds that corruption produces suboptimal law enforcement, studies seldom investigate the way this takes place and the government agents enforcing regulations are rarely at the center of analysis. It is here argued that corruption in enforcing authorities risks leading to a situation of covenants with broken swords. In such a condition, bribery corrodes the effectiveness of sanctions for noncompliance. Using original data this article outlines some of the mechanisms of this process and develops our understanding of how widespread bribery becomes an obstacle in enforcement. It also points to improvements in the analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users under widespread bribery.
Illustrating the destructive effects from corruption on governance of the commons, these findings resonates a big challenge for scholars and policy-makers. How to tackle the fact that CPRs around the world -for instance, the tropical forest reserves that are key in global efforts to store carbon and protect biodiversity -are monitored by institutions that are infested with corruption? Future research therefore has several tasks on its agenda. First, to get a better diagnosis of this problem, it would be worthwhile to analyze if this case is comparable to other contexts. The research on corruption in local governance of CPRs still relies on a scarce number of in-depth studies and may benefit from a comparative approach across CPR regimes with external enforcing authorities. A pertinent issue for comparative research would be to disentangle the institutional circumstances under which we may find situation of covenants with broken swords. Second, to get an improved understanding of cures to such situations, it is essential to explore if there are institutional remedies that are successful in reducing corruption. There is also a need to study existing or future alternatives for monitoring when corruption in enforcement authorities is widespread. It has been said that "when state agencies are involved in corruption and rentseeking, bottom-up initiatives may improve monitoring" (de la Torre-Castro 2006, p. 11).
28
A future discussion on governance of CPRs would profit from investigating alternatives or complements to strategies of state-run enforcement further.
